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Prova de 2014: Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) — questões com gabarito

95 questões da prova de 2014 de Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), em Inglês, Português. Cada uma tem página própria, com enunciado completo, alternativas e gabarito — e dá para responder na própria página.

  • 95 questões

Matérias nesta prova

Resultados: 95 questões

Página 3 de 5

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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    At the end of paragraph 6, “This” in the sentence “This was, and remains, a fallacy” most likely refers to the belief that
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e30a70f-d8
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    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    With respect to the sabbath, which of the following is not supported by the information in the article?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e348cf3-d8
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    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    In paragraph 1, “The facts” in the sentence “The facts have never been in dispute” most likely refers to all of the following except
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e390e20-d8
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    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    According to the information in the article, Freddie Hall’s lawyers most likely believe that
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e3c395a-d8
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    With respect to Freddie Hall, which of the following is most supported by the information in the article?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e413cb4-d8
    Abrir questão de Inglês, FGV 2014
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    Which of the following is most supported by the information in the article?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e4529b2-d8
    Abrir questão de Inglês, FGV 2014
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    Which of the following questions most likely expresses the “simple but eternal problem” mentioned in paragraph 3?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e48febe-d8
    Abrir questão de Inglês, FGV 2014
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    With respect to punishment, which of the following is most supported by the information in the article?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e4c3e00-d8
    Abrir questão de Inglês, FGV 2014
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

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    Imagem da questão de Inglês, FGV 2014, Interpretação de texto | Reading comprehension
    As mentioned in the last paragraph, which of the following probably best explains why English juries “used to throw tied-up defendants into a body of water”?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 2e4f877e-d8
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos
    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    The excerpt from the fourth paragraph – had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. – denotes an idea of
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a64e47e-3c
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos
    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    The word hers, as used in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph, refers to the Argentine
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a711c00-3c
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos
    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    According to the sixth paragraph,
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a768bed-3c
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos
    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    In the excerpt from the last paragraph – ... perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state – the expression financial rogue state implies a country which is
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a7d3394-3c
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos
    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    The last paragraph implies that
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a82607f-3c
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  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos
    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    In the last sentence of the text, the use of the phrase Argentina should hold its nose implies that Argentina should
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a8750ea-3c
    Abrir questão de Inglês, FGV 2014
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    Português

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    Leia os quadrinhos.

    Imagem da questão de Português, FGV 2014, Estrutura das Palavras: Radical, Desinência, Prefixo e Sufixo

    Nos quadrinhos, a sequência macroeconomia-microeconomia-nanoeconomia é empregada para

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    Português

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos

       Leia o texto para responder às questões de números 122 a 125.

        Nuvens contêm uma quantidade impressionante de água. Mesmo as pequenas podem reter um volume de 750 km³ de água e, se calcularmos meio grama de água por metro cúbico, essas minúsculas gotas flutuantes podem formar verdadeiros lagos voadores.

       Imagine a situação de um agricultor que observa, planando sobre os campos ressecados, nuvens contendo água mais que suficiente para salvar sua lavoura e deixar um bom saldo, mas que, em vez disso, produzem apenas algumas gotas antes de desaparecer no horizonte. É essa situação desesperadora que leva o mundo todo a gastar milhões de dólares todos os anos tentando controlar a chuva.

        Nos Estados Unidos, a tendência de extrair mais umidade do ar vem aumentando em mais um ano de secas severas. Em boa parte das planícies centrais e do sudoeste do país, os níveis de chuva, desde 2010, têm diminuído entre um e dois terços, com impacto direto nos preços do milho, trigo e soja. A Califórnia, fonte de boa parte das frutas e legumes que abastecem o país, ainda deve recuperar-se de uma seca que deixou seus reservatórios com metade da capacidade e áreas sem gelo perigosamente reduzidas. Em fevereiro, o Serviço Nacional do Clima divulgou que o estado tem uma chance em mil de se recuperar logo. Produtores de amêndoas estão preocupados com suas plantações por falta de umidade, e até a água potável está ameaçada.

    (Scientific American Brasil, julho de 2014. Adaptado)

    Em conformidade com a norma-padrão da língua portuguesa e sem alterar os sentidos do texto, a frase final pode ser reescrita da seguinte forma:
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5b39e5d1-3c
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  • Linguagens

    Português

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos

       Leia o texto para responder às questões de números 122 a 125.

        Nuvens contêm uma quantidade impressionante de água. Mesmo as pequenas podem reter um volume de 750 km³ de água e, se calcularmos meio grama de água por metro cúbico, essas minúsculas gotas flutuantes podem formar verdadeiros lagos voadores.

       Imagine a situação de um agricultor que observa, planando sobre os campos ressecados, nuvens contendo água mais que suficiente para salvar sua lavoura e deixar um bom saldo, mas que, em vez disso, produzem apenas algumas gotas antes de desaparecer no horizonte. É essa situação desesperadora que leva o mundo todo a gastar milhões de dólares todos os anos tentando controlar a chuva.

        Nos Estados Unidos, a tendência de extrair mais umidade do ar vem aumentando em mais um ano de secas severas. Em boa parte das planícies centrais e do sudoeste do país, os níveis de chuva, desde 2010, têm diminuído entre um e dois terços, com impacto direto nos preços do milho, trigo e soja. A Califórnia, fonte de boa parte das frutas e legumes que abastecem o país, ainda deve recuperar-se de uma seca que deixou seus reservatórios com metade da capacidade e áreas sem gelo perigosamente reduzidas. Em fevereiro, o Serviço Nacional do Clima divulgou que o estado tem uma chance em mil de se recuperar logo. Produtores de amêndoas estão preocupados com suas plantações por falta de umidade, e até a água potável está ameaçada.

    (Scientific American Brasil, julho de 2014. Adaptado)

    No texto, são exemplos de palavras formadas por derivação prefixal e por derivação sufixal, respectivamente:
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  • Linguagens

    Português

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos

       Leia o texto para responder às questões de números 122 a 125.

        Nuvens contêm uma quantidade impressionante de água. Mesmo as pequenas podem reter um volume de 750 km³ de água e, se calcularmos meio grama de água por metro cúbico, essas minúsculas gotas flutuantes podem formar verdadeiros lagos voadores.

       Imagine a situação de um agricultor que observa, planando sobre os campos ressecados, nuvens contendo água mais que suficiente para salvar sua lavoura e deixar um bom saldo, mas que, em vez disso, produzem apenas algumas gotas antes de desaparecer no horizonte. É essa situação desesperadora que leva o mundo todo a gastar milhões de dólares todos os anos tentando controlar a chuva.

        Nos Estados Unidos, a tendência de extrair mais umidade do ar vem aumentando em mais um ano de secas severas. Em boa parte das planícies centrais e do sudoeste do país, os níveis de chuva, desde 2010, têm diminuído entre um e dois terços, com impacto direto nos preços do milho, trigo e soja. A Califórnia, fonte de boa parte das frutas e legumes que abastecem o país, ainda deve recuperar-se de uma seca que deixou seus reservatórios com metade da capacidade e áreas sem gelo perigosamente reduzidas. Em fevereiro, o Serviço Nacional do Clima divulgou que o estado tem uma chance em mil de se recuperar logo. Produtores de amêndoas estão preocupados com suas plantações por falta de umidade, e até a água potável está ameaçada.

    (Scientific American Brasil, julho de 2014. Adaptado)

    Observe os enunciados:

    – ... planando sobre os campos ressecados... (2.º parágrafo)

    – ... tentando controlar a chuva. (2.º parágrafo)

    – ... em mais um ano de secas severas. (3.º parágrafo)

    No contexto em que estão empregados, os termos em destaque significam, respectivamente:

    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5b4510fd-3c
    Abrir questão de Português, FGV 2014
  • Linguagens

    Português

    Entre para guardar nos favoritos

       Leia o texto para responder às questões de números 122 a 125.

        Nuvens contêm uma quantidade impressionante de água. Mesmo as pequenas podem reter um volume de 750 km³ de água e, se calcularmos meio grama de água por metro cúbico, essas minúsculas gotas flutuantes podem formar verdadeiros lagos voadores.

       Imagine a situação de um agricultor que observa, planando sobre os campos ressecados, nuvens contendo água mais que suficiente para salvar sua lavoura e deixar um bom saldo, mas que, em vez disso, produzem apenas algumas gotas antes de desaparecer no horizonte. É essa situação desesperadora que leva o mundo todo a gastar milhões de dólares todos os anos tentando controlar a chuva.

        Nos Estados Unidos, a tendência de extrair mais umidade do ar vem aumentando em mais um ano de secas severas. Em boa parte das planícies centrais e do sudoeste do país, os níveis de chuva, desde 2010, têm diminuído entre um e dois terços, com impacto direto nos preços do milho, trigo e soja. A Califórnia, fonte de boa parte das frutas e legumes que abastecem o país, ainda deve recuperar-se de uma seca que deixou seus reservatórios com metade da capacidade e áreas sem gelo perigosamente reduzidas. Em fevereiro, o Serviço Nacional do Clima divulgou que o estado tem uma chance em mil de se recuperar logo. Produtores de amêndoas estão preocupados com suas plantações por falta de umidade, e até a água potável está ameaçada.

    (Scientific American Brasil, julho de 2014. Adaptado)

    Assinale a alternativa em que o período, reescrito com base nas informações do texto, está correto quanto ao emprego da vírgula.
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5b4a2fa5-3c
    Abrir questão de Português, FGV 2014