Questões do ENEM: Linguagens

          A Housing Meltdown Looms in Brazil as Builders Seek Debt Relief

by Julia Leite and Paula Sambo

      August 26, 2015

      Not long ago, Brazil's real-estate market was one of the biggest symbols of the country's burgeoning economic might. Now, it's fallen victim to an ever-deepening recession.
       PDG Realty SA, once the largest homebuilder by revenue, hired Rothschild last week to help restructure 5.8 billion reais ($1.6 billion) of debt after second-quarter net sales sank 88 percent. Earlier this month, Rossi Residencial SA, which has 2.5 billion reais in debt, also brought in advisers to “restructure operations and review strategies." Since 2010, the builder has lost 99 percent of its stock-market value.
      The real-estate industry, which is equal to about 10 percent of Brazil's economy, is emerging as one of the latest casualties of a recession that analysts forecast will be its longest since the 1930s. To make matters worse, interest rates are the highest in almost a decade while inflation is soaring. “There is no real estate company that survives without sales," Bruno Mendonça Lima de Carvalho, the head of fixed income at Guide Investimentos SA, said from Sao Paulo. “You can't import or export apartments. You're relying solely on domestic activity."
      PDG tried to boost revenue by lowering prices, financing up to 20 percent of some home purchases and even offering to buy back apartments if banks deny financing. Still, it sold just 217 units in the second quarter on a net basis, compared with 1,749 in 2014.

      Negative Outlook

      On Friday, Moody's Investors Service cut PDG's rating three levels to Caa3, citing the possibility of significant losses for bondholders and other lenders. Secured creditors may recover less than 80 percent in a default, according to Moody's, which kept a negative outlook on the rating. “The company is facing additional liquidity pressures from a prolonged deterioration in industry dynamics, including weak sales speed, tight financing availability and declining real estate prices," Moody's said.
      Sao Paulo-based Rossi said in an e-mailed response to questions that second quarter sales improved and that the company's main focus is to reduce debt. Gross debt fell about 30 percent in the 12 months ended in June, Rossi said.
      Home sales in Latin America's biggest economy tumbled 14 percent in the first half of 2015, according to data from the national real estate institute. Builders cut new projects by 20 percent during that span, while available financing shrank by about a quarter.

      Real's Collapse

      That's a reversal from just two years ago, when realestate prices in places like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo had surged as much as 230 percent as rising incomes, a soaring real and record-low borrowing costs ignited a wave of home buying.  
      Brazilians find themselves in drastically different circumstances today. The currency fell 0.4 percent Wednesday as of 3:25 p.m. in New York, extending its loss this year to 26 percent. The jobless rate climbed to a five-year high of 7.5 percent last month.
      The central bank boosted its key rate to 14.25 percent in July, making it ever more expensive to finance the purchase of a home. “It's a matter of demand, and demand is really weak," Will Landers, who manages Latin American stocks at BlackRock, said from Princeton, New Jersey. “We may have reached a peak in interest rates, but they should continue to be at these levels for a while. Consumers will stay on the sidelines because debt levels are still high, and employment will get worse."

                              (Business Week at www.bloomberg.com/news. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

                China has created a monster it can't control

By Jeremy Warner

      3 Sep 2015 

      When in trouble, shoot the messenger. This timehonoured approach to dealing with unwelcome news was much in evidence in China this week when nearly 200 people were rounded up and criminally charged with spreading “false" rumours about the stock market and the economy, or otherwise profiting from their travails.
      One luckless financial journalist was ritually paraded on state TV, tearfully confessing his “crimes". Meanwhile, the head of the Chinese desk of one London-based hedge fund group was summoned to a “meeting" with regulators, and hasn't been heard of since. Her Chinese husband says “she's gone on holiday". We can only hope it is not to the re-indoctrination of the asbestos mines. Despite the massive progress of recent decades, old habits die hard.
      China was meant to have embraced free market reform, yet these latest actions suggest an altogether different approach. Roughly summarised, it amounts to: “Reform good, but woe betide the free market if it doesn't do what the high command wants it to." When the stock market was going up, the Chinese authorities were perfectly happy to tolerate what, to virtually all Western observers, looked like a dangerously speculative bubble, vaingloriously believing it to be a fair reflection of the wondrous successes of the Chinese economy.
      The first rule of stock market investment – that share prices can go down as well as up – seems to have been almost wholly forgotten in the scramble for instant riches. When, inevitably, the stock market crashed, the authorities threw the kitchen sink at the problem, but they failed to halt the carnage. This was an even ruder awakening – for it demonstrated to an already disillusioned public that policy-makers were no longer in control of events. Perhaps they hadn't noticed, but there are today more Chinese with stock trading accounts – some 90 million – than there are members of the Communist Party – “just" 80 million. In any case, powerless before the storm, the authorities have instead turned to scapegoating.
      Apparently more liberal, advanced economies, it ought to be said, are by no means averse to this kind of behaviour either. A few years back, Italian prosecutors charged nine employees of Standard & Poor's and Fitch Rating with market abuse for daring to downgrade Italy's credit rating, while it is still commonplace in France to blame Anglo-Saxon speculators and their cronies in the London press for any financial or economic setback.
      Nor are Western governments and central bankers averse to a little market manipulation when it suits them. What is “quantitative easing" other than money printing to prop up asset prices, including stocks and shares? Chinese refusal to accept the judgments of “Mr Market", it might be argued, is just a more extreme version of the same thing. Small wonder that European officials sometimes look longingly across at the state-directed capitalism practised in China, and pronounce it a model we might perhaps aspire to ourselves.
      As recent events have demonstrated, we should not. China's stock market crash is not the work of malicious financial journalists and short-selling hedge funds, but a signal of difficult time ahead and perhaps even of an economic roadcrash to come. After nearly 35 years of spectacular progress, the Chinese economy faces multiple challenges on many fronts which are not going to be solved by denying harsh realities and imprisoning journalists.
      The progress of recent decades belies an industrial sector which in truth has become quite seriously uncompetitive by international standards. Many of China's factories need completely retooling to keep up with developments in robotics and other forms of mechanisation. Yet if industry is to get less labour intensive, this only further steepens the challenge of employment creation.
      It is reckoned that China needs to create some 20 million jobs a year just to keep pace with employment demand as the population shifts from land to town, eight million of them in high-end professions to cater for the country's burgeoning output of graduates. China's modernisation has created a monster which it is struggling to feed.
      As the export-growth story waned, China compensated by unleashing a massive investment boom, which internal demand is now struggling to keep up with, rendering many of the country's shiny new constructs uneconomic and overburdened with bad debts.
      The Chinese leadership looks to growth in consumption and service industries to plug the gap, but these new sources of demand can't do so without further free-market reform, which in turn requires further loosening of the shackles of political control. Without growth, the Communist Party loses its political legitimacy, yet the old growth model is broken, and to achieve a new one, the authorities must cede the very power and influence that sustains them. Rumour-mongering journalists and short-selling speculators can only be blamed for so long.

                                                             (http://www.telegraph.co.uk. Adapted)

    Na virada do século, chegou o euro. Na prática, era como se o marco alemão mudasse de nome para “euro" e passasse a suprir o resto do continente (a maior parte dele, pelo menos). Parecia bom para todas as partes. Os governos dos países menos pibados passariam a receber os impostos dos seus cidadãos em euros, uma moeda garantida pelo PIB alemão. Impostos servem para pagar as dívidas dos governos – além da lagosta dos governantes. E agora os contribuintes pagavam em euros. Resultado: o mercado passou a emprestar para os países bagunçados da Europa a juros baixíssimos.

      Aí choveu euro na periferia da Europa. A economia ali cresceu como nunca, mas os governantes gastaram como sempre. Além disso, não perceberam que seus países eram pequenos demais para suportar o peso de uma moeda forte.

      Com os PIBs dos europobres caindo, a arrecadação deles diminuiu. Menos arrecadação, mais problemas para pagar dívidas. Aí tome mais dinheiro emprestado para ir rolando a pendura, só que agora a juros menos fofos.

(Superinteressante, agosto de 2015. Adaptado)

    Na virada do século, chegou o euro. Na prática, era como se o marco alemão mudasse de nome para “euro" e passasse a suprir o resto do continente (a maior parte dele, pelo menos). Parecia bom para todas as partes. Os governos dos países menos pibados passariam a receber os impostos dos seus cidadãos em euros, uma moeda garantida pelo PIB alemão. Impostos servem para pagar as dívidas dos governos – além da lagosta dos governantes. E agora os contribuintes pagavam em euros. Resultado: o mercado passou a emprestar para os países bagunçados da Europa a juros baixíssimos.

      Aí choveu euro na periferia da Europa. A economia ali cresceu como nunca, mas os governantes gastaram como sempre. Além disso, não perceberam que seus países eram pequenos demais para suportar o peso de uma moeda forte.

      Com os PIBs dos europobres caindo, a arrecadação deles diminuiu. Menos arrecadação, mais problemas para pagar dívidas. Aí tome mais dinheiro emprestado para ir rolando a pendura, só que agora a juros menos fofos.

(Superinteressante, agosto de 2015. Adaptado)

          O velho Lima

      O velho Lima, que era empregado – empregado antigo – numa das nossas repartições públicas, e morava no Engenho de Dentro, caiu de cama, seriamente enfermo, no dia 14 de novembro de 1889, isto é, na véspera da Proclamação da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.
      O doente não considerou a moléstia coisa de cuidado, e tanto assim foi que não quis médico. Entretanto, o velho Lima esteve de molho oito dias.
      O nosso homem tinha o hábito de não ler jornais e, como em casa nada lhe dissessem (porque nada sabiam), ele ignorava completamente que o Império se transformara em República.
      No dia 23, restabelecido e pronto para outra, comprou um bilhete, segundo o seu costume, e tomou lugar no trem, ao lado do comendador Vidal, que o recebeu com estas palavras:
      – Bom dia, cidadão.
      O velho Lima estranhou o cidadão, mas de si para si pensou que o comendador dissera aquilo como poderia ter dito ilustre, e não deu maior importância ao cumprimento, limitando-se a responder:
      – Bom dia, comendador.
      – Qual comendador! Chama-me Vidal! Já não há mais comendadores!
      – Ora essa! Então por quê?
      – A República deu cabo de todas as comendas! Acabaram-se!
      O velho Lima encarou o comendador e calou-se, receoso de não ter compreendido a pilhéria.
      Ao entrar na sua seção, o velho Lima sentou-se e viu que tinham tirado da parede uma velha litografia representando D. Pedro de Alcântara. Como na ocasião passasse um contínuo, perguntou-lhe:
      – Por que tiraram da parede o retrato de Sua Majestade?
      O contínuo respondeu num tom lentamente desdenhoso:
      – Ora, cidadão, que fazia ali a figura do Pedro Banana?
      – Pedro Banana! – repetiu raivoso o velho Lima.
      – Não dou três anos para que isso seja República!

                                                  (Arthur Azevedo. Seleção de contos, 2014)

          O velho Lima

      O velho Lima, que era empregado – empregado antigo – numa das nossas repartições públicas, e morava no Engenho de Dentro, caiu de cama, seriamente enfermo, no dia 14 de novembro de 1889, isto é, na véspera da Proclamação da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.
      O doente não considerou a moléstia coisa de cuidado, e tanto assim foi que não quis médico. Entretanto, o velho Lima esteve de molho oito dias.
      O nosso homem tinha o hábito de não ler jornais e, como em casa nada lhe dissessem (porque nada sabiam), ele ignorava completamente que o Império se transformara em República.
      No dia 23, restabelecido e pronto para outra, comprou um bilhete, segundo o seu costume, e tomou lugar no trem, ao lado do comendador Vidal, que o recebeu com estas palavras:
      – Bom dia, cidadão.
      O velho Lima estranhou o cidadão, mas de si para si pensou que o comendador dissera aquilo como poderia ter dito ilustre, e não deu maior importância ao cumprimento, limitando-se a responder:
      – Bom dia, comendador.
      – Qual comendador! Chama-me Vidal! Já não há mais comendadores!
      – Ora essa! Então por quê?
      – A República deu cabo de todas as comendas! Acabaram-se!
      O velho Lima encarou o comendador e calou-se, receoso de não ter compreendido a pilhéria.
      Ao entrar na sua seção, o velho Lima sentou-se e viu que tinham tirado da parede uma velha litografia representando D. Pedro de Alcântara. Como na ocasião passasse um contínuo, perguntou-lhe:
      – Por que tiraram da parede o retrato de Sua Majestade?
      O contínuo respondeu num tom lentamente desdenhoso:
      – Ora, cidadão, que fazia ali a figura do Pedro Banana?
      – Pedro Banana! – repetiu raivoso o velho Lima.
      – Não dou três anos para que isso seja República!

                                                  (Arthur Azevedo. Seleção de contos, 2014)

          O velho Lima

      O velho Lima, que era empregado – empregado antigo – numa das nossas repartições públicas, e morava no Engenho de Dentro, caiu de cama, seriamente enfermo, no dia 14 de novembro de 1889, isto é, na véspera da Proclamação da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.
      O doente não considerou a moléstia coisa de cuidado, e tanto assim foi que não quis médico. Entretanto, o velho Lima esteve de molho oito dias.
      O nosso homem tinha o hábito de não ler jornais e, como em casa nada lhe dissessem (porque nada sabiam), ele ignorava completamente que o Império se transformara em República.
      No dia 23, restabelecido e pronto para outra, comprou um bilhete, segundo o seu costume, e tomou lugar no trem, ao lado do comendador Vidal, que o recebeu com estas palavras:
      – Bom dia, cidadão.
      O velho Lima estranhou o cidadão, mas de si para si pensou que o comendador dissera aquilo como poderia ter dito ilustre, e não deu maior importância ao cumprimento, limitando-se a responder:
      – Bom dia, comendador.
      – Qual comendador! Chama-me Vidal! Já não há mais comendadores!
      – Ora essa! Então por quê?
      – A República deu cabo de todas as comendas! Acabaram-se!
      O velho Lima encarou o comendador e calou-se, receoso de não ter compreendido a pilhéria.
      Ao entrar na sua seção, o velho Lima sentou-se e viu que tinham tirado da parede uma velha litografia representando D. Pedro de Alcântara. Como na ocasião passasse um contínuo, perguntou-lhe:
      – Por que tiraram da parede o retrato de Sua Majestade?
      O contínuo respondeu num tom lentamente desdenhoso:
      – Ora, cidadão, que fazia ali a figura do Pedro Banana?
      – Pedro Banana! – repetiu raivoso o velho Lima.
      – Não dou três anos para que isso seja República!

                                                  (Arthur Azevedo. Seleção de contos, 2014)

          O velho Lima

      O velho Lima, que era empregado – empregado antigo – numa das nossas repartições públicas, e morava no Engenho de Dentro, caiu de cama, seriamente enfermo, no dia 14 de novembro de 1889, isto é, na véspera da Proclamação da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.
      O doente não considerou a moléstia coisa de cuidado, e tanto assim foi que não quis médico. Entretanto, o velho Lima esteve de molho oito dias.
      O nosso homem tinha o hábito de não ler jornais e, como em casa nada lhe dissessem (porque nada sabiam), ele ignorava completamente que o Império se transformara em República.
      No dia 23, restabelecido e pronto para outra, comprou um bilhete, segundo o seu costume, e tomou lugar no trem, ao lado do comendador Vidal, que o recebeu com estas palavras:
      – Bom dia, cidadão.
      O velho Lima estranhou o cidadão, mas de si para si pensou que o comendador dissera aquilo como poderia ter dito ilustre, e não deu maior importância ao cumprimento, limitando-se a responder:
      – Bom dia, comendador.
      – Qual comendador! Chama-me Vidal! Já não há mais comendadores!
      – Ora essa! Então por quê?
      – A República deu cabo de todas as comendas! Acabaram-se!
      O velho Lima encarou o comendador e calou-se, receoso de não ter compreendido a pilhéria.
      Ao entrar na sua seção, o velho Lima sentou-se e viu que tinham tirado da parede uma velha litografia representando D. Pedro de Alcântara. Como na ocasião passasse um contínuo, perguntou-lhe:
      – Por que tiraram da parede o retrato de Sua Majestade?
      O contínuo respondeu num tom lentamente desdenhoso:
      – Ora, cidadão, que fazia ali a figura do Pedro Banana?
      – Pedro Banana! – repetiu raivoso o velho Lima.
      – Não dou três anos para que isso seja República!

                                                  (Arthur Azevedo. Seleção de contos, 2014)

O texto a seguir é referência para a questão.

Venício A. Lima

    O sempre interessante Boletim UFMG, que traz, a cada semana, notícias do dia a dia da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, informa, na edição de 4 de maio, o trabalho desenvolvido por grupo de pesquisa do Departamento de Ciência da Computação (DCC) em torno da “análise de sentimento", que relaciona o sucesso das notícias com sua polaridade, negativa ou positiva.

    Utilizando programas de computador desenvolvidos pelo DCC-UFMG, foram identificadas, coletadas e analisadas 69.907 manchetes veiculadas em quatro sites noticiosos internacionais ao longo de oito meses de 2014: The New York Times, BBC, Reuters e Daily Mail. E as notícias foram agrupadas em cinco grandes categorias: negócios e dinheiro, saúde, ciência e tecnologia, esportes e mundo. As conclusões da pesquisa são preciosas.

    Cerca de 70% das notícias diárias estão relacionadas a fatos que geram “sentimentos negativos" – tais como catástrofes, acidentes, doenças, crimes e crises. Os textos das manchetes foram relacionados aos sentimentos que elas despertam, numa escala de menos 5 (muito negativo) a mais 5 (muito positivo). Descobriu-se que o sucesso de uma notícia, vale dizer, o número de vezes em que é “clicada" pelo eventual leitor está fortemente vinculado a esses “sentimentos" e que os dois extremos – negativo e positivo – são os mais “clicados". As manchetes negativas, todavia, são aquelas que atraem maior interesse dos leitores.

    Embora realizado com base em manchetes publicadas em sites internacionais – não brasileiros –, os resultados do trabalho dos pesquisadores do DCC-UFMG nos ajudam a compreender a predominância do “jornalismo do vale de lágrimas" na grande mídia brasileira.

    Para além da partidarização seletiva das notícias, parece haver também uma importante estratégia de sobrevivência empresarial influindo na escolha da pauta negativa. Os principais telejornais exibidos na televisão brasileira, por exemplo, estão se transformando em incansáveis noticiários diários de crises, crimes, catástrofes, acidentes e doenças de todos os tipos. Carrega-se, sem dó nem piedade, nas notícias que geram sentimentos negativos. Mais do que isso: os âncoras dos telejornais, além das notícias negativas, se encarregam de editorializar, fazer comentários, invariavelmente críticos e pessimistas, reforçando, para além da notícia, exatamente seus aspectos e consequências funestos.

    Existe, sim, o risco do esgotamento. Cansado de tanta notícia ruim e sentindo-se impotente para influir no curso dos eventos, pode ser que o leitor/telespectador afinal desista de se expor a esse tipo de jornalismo que o empurra cotidianamente rumo a um inexorável “vale de lágrimas" mediavalesco.

Adaptado de < http://observatoriodaimprensa.com.br/jornal-de-eba...>.Acesso em 19 mai. 2015. 

Ao criar o termo mediavalesco que finaliza o texto, o autor associa a media/mídia ao termo medievalesco, ou seja, relativo à Idade Média. Sua intenção, com isso, é ressaltar um aspecto dos meios de comunicação que poderia ser resumido pelo termo:

O texto a seguir é referência para a questão.

Famílias em transformação

    O projeto de lei que cria o Estatuto da Família colocou na pauta do dia a discussão a respeito do conceito de família. Afinal, o que é família hoje? Alguém aí tem uma definição, para a atualidade, que consiga acolher todos os grupos existentes que vivem em contextos familiares?

    A Câmara dos Deputados tem a resposta que considera a certa: “Família é a união entre homem e mulher, por meio de casamento ou de união estável, ou a comunidade formada por qualquer um dos pais junto com os filhos". Essa é a definição aprovada pela Câmara para o projeto cuja finalidade é orientar as políticas públicas quanto aos direitos das famílias – essas que se encaixam na definição proposta –, principalmente nas áreas de segurança, saúde e educação. Vou deixar de lado a discussão a respeito das injustiças, preconceitos e exclusões que tal definição comporta, para conversar a respeito das famílias da atualidade.

    Desde o início da segunda metade do século passado, o conceito de família entrou em crise, e uso a palavra crise no sentido mais positivo do termo: o que aponta para renovação e transição; mudança, enfim. Até então, tínhamos, na modernidade, uma configuração social hegemônica de família, que era pautada por um tipo de aliança – entre um homem e uma mulher – e por relações de consanguinidade. As mudanças ocorridas no mundo determinaram inúmeras alterações nas famílias, não apenas em seu desenho, mas, principalmente, em suas dinâmicas.

    E é importante aceitar essa questão: não foram as famílias que provocaram mudanças na sociedade; esta é que determinou muitas mudanças nas famílias. Só assim iremos conseguir enxergar que a família não é um agente de perturbação da sociedade. É a sociedade que tem perturbado, e muito, o funcionamento familiar. Um exemplo? Algumas mulheres renunciam ao direito de ficar com o filho recém-nascido durante todo o período da licença-maternidade determinado por lei, porque isso pode atrapalhar sua carreira profissional. Em outras palavras: elas entenderam que a sociedade prioriza o trabalho em detrimento da dedicação à família. É assim ou não é?

    Se pudéssemos levantar um único quesito que seria fundamental para caracterizar a transformação de um agrupamento de pessoas em família, eu diria que é o vínculo, tanto horizontal quanto vertical. E, hoje, todo mundo conhece grupos de pessoas que vivem sob o mesmo teto ou que têm relação de parentesco que não se constituem verdadeiramente em família, por absoluta falta de vínculo entre seus integrantes.

    Os novos valores sociais têm norteado as pessoas para esse caminho. Vamos lembrar valores decisivos para nossa sociedade: o consumo, que valoriza o trabalho exagerado, a ambição desmedida e o sucesso a qualquer custo; a juventude, que leva adultos, independentemente da idade, a adotar um estilo de vida juvenil, que dá pouco espaço para o compromisso que os vínculos exigem; a busca da felicidade, identificada com satisfação imediata, que leva a trocas sucessivas nos relacionamentos amorosos, como amizades e par afetivo, só para citar alguns exemplos. O vínculo afetivo tem relação com a vida pessoal. O vínculo social, com a cidadania. Ambos estão bem frágeis, não é?

SAYÃO, Rosely.  <www.folhaonline.com.br>. Em 29 set. 2015.

Identifique como verdadeiras (V) ou falsas (F) as seguintes afirmativas sobre o uso de expressões e/ou sinais de pontuação no texto.

( ) O diálogo com o leitor é marcado no texto pelo uso da expressão “alguém aí", na segunda linha, e pelo uso recorrente da interrogação.

( ) A expressão sublinhada em “a Câmara dos Deputados tem a resposta que considera a certa" antecipa para o leitor a adesão da autora à definição de família aprovada para o projeto de lei do Estatuto da Família.

( ) No trecho “direitos das famílias – essas que se encaixam na definição proposta –", a expressão entre travessões alerta o leitor para a restrição do conceito de família mencionado.

( ) As expressões “desde o início da segunda metade do século passado" e “até então" (3º parágrafo) introduzem informações situadas em um mesmo período.

Assinale a alternativa que apresenta a sequência correta, de cima para baixo.