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Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In the last sentence of the text, the use of the phrase Argentina should hold its nose implies that Argentina should

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The last paragraph implies that

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The word hers, as used in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph, refers to the Argentine

 

 

According to the text, digital capital.

 

 

In terms of numerical reference.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In Paragraph 2, 'both of whom' (line 19) refers to.

Ao se misturarem 100 mL de solução aquosa 0,100 mol L^-1 de ácido propanoico (Ka = 1,3 x 10^-5 ) com 50 mL de solução aquosa da base forte NaOH (0,100 mol L^-1 ), tem-se uma solução

Nas equações abaixo, representadas na forma simplificada, há espécies ionizadas (não mostradas nessa forma) que participam das reações enquanto outras não:


I. KCl(aq) + AgNO₃(aq) → AgCl(s) + KNO₃(aq)


II. FeCl₃(aq) + SnCl₂(aq) → FeCl₂(aq) + SnCl₄(aq)


III. Ba(OH)₂(aq) + H₂SO₄(aq) → BaSO₄(s) + H₂O(l)




Nessas equações, os símbolos (aq), (s) e (l) representam, respectivamente, “espécies químicas dissolvidas em água", “espécies químicas no estado sólido" e “espécies químicas no estado líquido".




É correto afirmar que, na reação indicada, são íons espectadores 

Um elemento químico, representativo, cujos átomos possuem, em seu último nível, a configuração eletrônica 4s2 4p3 está localizado na tabela periódica dos elementos nos seguintes grupo e período, respectivamente:

Em meados do século XVIII, diversas monarquias europeias se modernizaram com base nos ideais iluministas para um programa de reformas que assegurasse uma administração mais racional e eficiente do Estado. Embora afirmassem agir em nome da “maior felicidade dos povos", estes permaneciam excluídos da tomada de decisões políticas.

Considerando as relações entre a cultura iluminista e as reformas promovidas pelos “soberanos esclarecidos", analise as afirmativas a seguir.

I – Os soberanos reformadores concentraram seus esforços no desmantelamento de privilégios fiscais e no redimensionamento dos poderes eclesiásticos, como no caso de Frederico II na Prússia e de
D. José I e de seu ministro Pombal em Portugal.

II – Os filósofos iluministas forneceram o tema da razão, da boa administração e da pública felicidade aos projetos absolutistas dos monarcas e o da liberdade à oposição antiabsolutista.

III – Os opositores do reformismo monárquico eram juristas e magistrados tradicionalistas, a nobreza fundiária e o alto clero, ameaçados pela dissolução da sociedade de ordens promovida pelos soberanos esclarecidos.

Assinale:

Analise as afirmativas abaixo que apresentam acontecimentos referidos à política da Corte portuguesa durante sua permanência no Brasil entre 1808 e 1821.


I – Como expressão da relação de poder assimétrica entre os soberanos britânico e português, os tratados de 1810 impunham ao governo de D. João no Rio de Janeiro, entre outras decisões, a limitação do tráfico negreiro intercontinental às colônias de Portugal na África e o compromisso de abolir gradualmente o trabalho escravo na América portuguesa.

II – A criação do primeiro Banco do Brasil, da Impressão Régia, da Escola de Medicina, das Academias Militar e de Marinha, do Real Horto, da Real Biblioteca e inúmeras outras medidas, assim como a conquista da Guiana Francesa e a ocupação da Banda Oriental, revelavam o projeto político da Corte joanina de “criar um novo império" na América, tendo como sede a cidade do Rio de Janeiro.

III – Ao revogar o alvará de 1785 que proibia qualquer atividade manufatureira na colônia americana, com exceção da fabricação de panos grossos para a vestimenta dos escravos, o Príncipe- Regente D. João propiciou o surgimento de inúmeros estabelecimentos fabris em diferentes pontos do Reino do Brasil, deflagrando o primeiro grande surto industrial do país, apesar da permanência do trabalho escravo.

IV – A Revolução Pernambucana de 1817 teve como uma de suas motivações a reação aos privilégios concedidos por D. João aos comerciantes, burocratas e proprietários de escravos e terras do Rio de Janeiro e áreas próximas, o que lhes possibilitara prosperar, acumular poder e ganhar prestígio. Para os revolucionários de 1817, o Rio de Janeiro se transformara em uma “nova Lisboa", dominada por “portugueses" que oprimiam os “brasileiros" de outras partes do Reino do Brasil.

Assinale:

Considerando a ideologia do partido Nacional-Socialista na Alemanha nos anos 1930 e 1940, examine as afirmativas:

I – Um dos pilares da ideologia nacional-socialista era seu apelo ao anticomunismo e à rejeição ao projeto político que estava em curso na União Soviética.

II – O nacional-socialismo alemão conseguiu ter sucesso econômico rápido devido a medidas direcionadas para o livre comércio e para a liberdade cambial. Com isso houve a estabilização da moeda após a crise da hiperinflação e um período de crescimento acelerado da economia.

III – O partido Nacional-Socialista foi vitorioso nas eleições de 1932, o que demonstrou a seus líderes que a democracia – mesmo com falhas – era o melhor sistema político para realizar seus projetos.

IV – O ideário do nacional-socialismo sempre deixou clara a ideia de “pureza racial". Com isso, desde os primeiros anos de governo, foram emitidas diversas leis contra judeus, homossexuais e ciganos, consideradas- entre outras - como populações “impuras".

Assinale:

Assinale a alternativa que NÃO caracteriza de modo correto as ditaduras militares instauradas em diferentes países da América Latina nas décadas de 1960 e 1970.

A região sombreada na representação é uma das várias existentes pelo planeta formadas de grupos de nacionalidades sem Estado. Essa região não contemplada com um território reconhecido internacionalmente é chamada de: