Prova de 2014: Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) — questões com gabarito

     Em seu livro O pequeno príncipe, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry imaginou haver vida em certo planeta ideal. Tal planeta teria dimensões curiosas e grandezas gravitacionais inimagináveis na prática. Pesquisas científicas, entretanto, continuam sendo realizadas e não se descarta a possibilidade de haver mais planetas no sistema solar, além dos já conhecidos.

      Imagine um hipotético planeta, distante do Sol 10 vezes mais longe do que a Terra se encontra desse astro, com massa 4 vezes maior que a terrestre e raio superficial igual à metade do raio da Terra. Considere a aceleração da gravidade na superfície da Terra expressa por g.

Um objeto, de massa m, a uma altura h acima do solo desse planeta, com h muito menor do que o raio superficial do planeta, teria uma energia potencial dada por m·g·h multiplicada pelo fator

     Em seu livro O pequeno príncipe, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry imaginou haver vida em certo planeta ideal. Tal planeta teria dimensões curiosas e grandezas gravitacionais inimagináveis na prática. Pesquisas científicas, entretanto, continuam sendo realizadas e não se descarta a possibilidade de haver mais planetas no sistema solar, além dos já conhecidos.

      Imagine um hipotético planeta, distante do Sol 10 vezes mais longe do que a Terra se encontra desse astro, com massa 4 vezes maior que a terrestre e raio superficial igual à metade do raio da Terra. Considere a aceleração da gravidade na superfície da Terra expressa por g.

Esse planeta completaria uma volta em torno do Sol em um tempo, expresso em anos terrestres, mais próximo de

Dois estudantes da FGV divertem-se jogando sinuca, após uma exaustiva jornada de estudos. Um deles impulsiona a bola branca sobre a bola vermelha, idênticas exceto pela cor, inicialmente em repouso. Eles observam que, imediatamente após a colisão frontal, a bola branca para e a vermelha passa a se deslocar na mesma direção e no mesmo sentido da velocidade anterior da bola branca, mas de valor 10% menor que a referida velocidade. Sobre esse evento, é correto afirmar que houve conservação de momento linear do sistema de bolas, mas sua energia mecânica diminuiu em

A força resistiva (Fr) que o ar exerce sobre os corpos em movimento assume, em determinadas condições, a expressão Fr = k · v² , em que v é a velocidade do corpo em relação a um referencial inercial e k é uma constante para cada corpo. Para que a expressão citada seja homogênea, a unidade de k, no sistema internacional de unidades, deve ser

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In the last sentence of the text, the use of the phrase Argentina should hold its nose implies that Argentina should

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The last paragraph implies that

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


In the excerpt from the last paragraph – ... perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state – the expression financial rogue state implies a country which is

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


According to the sixth paragraph,

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The word hers, as used in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph, refers to the Argentine

Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

Aug 2nd 2014

     ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

     Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

    Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

     Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

     Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

     Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

   More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

(http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


The excerpt from the fourth paragraph – had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. – denotes an idea of

As explosões que abalam Gaza e Israel abafaram um ruído que é potencialmente muito mais perigoso. Refiro-me às declarações do primeiro-ministro Binyamin Netanyahu de que Israel tem de se assegurar de que "não haverá outra Gaza na Judeia e Samaria" (como os judeus se referem ao território que a comunidade internacional trata por Cisjordânia e é habitado majoritariamente pelos palestinos). Mais especificamente, Netanyahu declarou:
"Acho que o povo de Israel compreende agora o que eu sempre disse: não pode haver uma situação, sob qualquer acordo, na qual nós renunciemos ao controle de segurança no território a oeste do rio Jordão" (de novo, os territórios palestinos).

        http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/colunas/clovisrossi/2014/07/1487168-palestina-o-sonho-acabou.shtml

Assinale a alternativa que apresenta uma interpretação correta das declarações do primeiro- ministro Binyamin Netanyahu.

O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Barack Obama, assegurou neste sábado (9/08) que os ataques aéreos americanos contra os jihadistas que estão tomando o Curdistão iraquiano, no norte do país, continuarão enquanto for necessário.

                                                                                                http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/efe/20...
                               obama-assegura-que-seguira-bombardeando-jihadistas-enquanto-for-necessario.htm

Sobre essa intervenção estadunidense no Iraque, é correto afirmar:

Então, reduzir a desigualdade por meio da redistribuição prejudica o crescimento econômico? Não, segundo dois estudos marcantes feitos por economistas do FMI (Fundo Monetário Internacional), que dificilmente é uma organização de esquerda. O primeiro estudo examinou as relações históricas entre desigualdade e crescimento e descobriu que os países com desigualdade de renda relativamente baixa "têm mais êxito em alcançar um crescimento econômico sustentado, em oposição a surtos ocasionais". O segundo, divulgado no mês passado, analisou diretamente o efeito da redistribuição de renda e concluiu que "a redistribuição parece geralmente benigna em termos de seu impacto sobre o crescimento.

                                                                                           http://noticias.uol.com.br/blogs-e-colunas/coluna/...
                                                          /2014/03/11/o-lugar-da-distribuicao-de-renda-no-discurso-publico.htm

Assinale a afirmativa coerente com os argumentos do texto:

A Líbia vive a violência mais mortífera desde a guerra de 2011 [...] e, perante a incapacidade do governo em restaurar a ordem, o país mergulha cada vez mais no caos.

                                                                                     http://www.publico.pt/mundo/noticia/dezenas-de-mor...
                                                                                         na-libia-levam-ao-exodo-dos-estrangeiros-1664466

Sobre a atual situação de violência mencionada na reportagem, é correto afirmar:

Mais de três quartos dos migrantes internacionais vão para um país com um nível mais elevado de desenvolvimento humano do que o do seu país de origem. Porém, são significativamente restringidos por políticas que impõem obstáculos à sua entrada e pela escassez de recursos disponíveis que lhes permitam a deslocação. As pessoas de países pobres são as que menos se mudam: por exemplo, o número de africanos que se mudou para a Europa é inferior a 1%.

                                                                               ONU/PNUD. Relatório de Desenvolvimento Humano 2009.
             Ultrapassar barreiras: mobilidade e desenvolvimento humano. Coimbra: Almedina, 2009. p. 2

Considerando o texto e os seus conhecimentos sobre os deslocamentos populacionais, assinale a alternativa correta:

Há um domínio natural (morfoclimático) brasileiro, que está situado em zona climática temperada, mas ainda sob efeito dos trópicos, por isso influenciado por um clima subtropical úmido de planaltos, com inverno bem delimitado e frio. Identifique a afirmação que define outras características desse domínio corretamente.

A cidade de Nova York, que se tornou um exemplo de adoção de faixas para ciclistas em grandes metrópoles, também enfrentou resistências e conflitos por causa do programa da ex-diretora do Departamento de Transporte Jannet Sadik-Khan. Durante os seis anos de sua gestão, de 2007 a 2013, ela mudou a face da cidade. Implantou 450 quilômetros de caminhos para bicicletas, fechou o Times Square para a circulação de veículos e 'roubou' espaços das ruas para as chamadas 'plazas' – locais de convivência, com mesinhas, cadeiras, guarda-sóis e quiosques de alimentação.

            Folha de S. Paulo. NY enfrentou protestos, mas tinha metrô e trens eficientes. 10/08/2014, p. C7.                                                                                                                                                                    Adaptado.

Considerando-se as metrópoles brasileiras, é correto afirmar:

Da mesma forma que a Terra Santa, ainda que com identidade menor, a Península Ibérica possibilitava a reunião das ideias de paz (luta no exterior da Cristandade), de Guerra Santa (engrandecimento da Igreja em terra anteriormente cristã) e de peregrinação (corpo santo apostólico em Santiago de Compostela). A Reconquista revelou-se especialmente atraente, o que é significativo, para o centro-sul francês (...) cujos cavaleiros foram os mais constantes participantes ultramontanos da luta antimoura na Península.

                                                                   FRANCO JÚNIOR, Hilário. Peregrinos, monges e guerreiros.
                 Feudo-clericalismo e religiosidade em Castela Medieval. São Paulo: Hucitec, 1990, p. 161.

Sobre a Reconquista Ibérica, é correto afirmar que se trata de

                                          FIGHTING FAT IN THE DESERT 

                                                  By Rod Nordland 

1 Qatari officials have been racking their brains to find a way to address their country's epidemic of obesity. They have built sports facilities, parks, and a splendid hillside road in the capital, with a seaside promenade and parkour stations; hosted fun runs with hefty cash prizes; set up free body mass index and blood pressure monitoring stations. Anything money can buy to draw their citizens — said to be first-richest in the world and sixth-fattest — out of a sedentary lifestyle, they seem to have bought.

2 The only thing is, even Qatar's great wealth has not been able to do anything about the weather, and in a country where highs top 40 degrees Celsius (104 Fahrenheit) for a large part of the year, getting anyone to go out and walk, let alone do outdoor sports, is a lost cause. About the only pedestrians in the summer, when temperatures are even higher, are expatriates. 

3 Now the sports health authorities have introduced a new program that aims to reach Qataris where they live, or at least where they shop — the climate-controlled shopping mall. Four of the emirate's major malls are participating in the program, called “Step Into Health: Walk More, Walk the Mall," posting maps and walking routes, along with information about how many calories could be burned in the process. The malls are also opening their halls two hours before and after shopping hours, for those who want their exercise free of consumerism.

4 “Mall walking is the perfect workout, alongside controlled temperatures; it provides a clean and safe environment to exercise," a promotional brochure for “Step Into Health" reads. The mall walk program is part of a broader effort to encourage Qataris “to walk 10,000 steps and more a day in a noncompetitive, recreational and social way." The organizers hasten to reassure people that mall walking need not be strenuous. “Unlike most community exercise programs, Step Into Health is not about working up a sweat," they say. The walking routes and speeds they have outlined are not likely to do that. 

5 Obesity is a touchy subject in the emirate. Data from the International Association for the Study of Obesity shows that Qatar has the highest obesity rates in the Middle East. About 34 percent of Qatar's men and 45 percent of its women are obese, defined as a body mass index of more than 30. 

6 Those figures, however, only begin to tell the tale. They are based on the emirate's total population of about 1.9 million, but most of those are migrant workers. Qatari citizens number only about 250,000. Since most of the migrant workers are construction and other manual laborers, obesity rates among citizens are likely to be far higher than overall figures suggest. 

7 The first mall walk two weeks ago was pronounced a big success by the government-controlled news media, with some 1,000 people showing up to take part — encouraged by handouts of pedometers (free to anyone who registers for Step Into Health), and free raffles of iPhones, laptops and other Qatari-size baubles. 

8 After that initial outpouring of interest, however, there was relatively little follow-up — a common phenomenon, as every gym manager knows. Soon after, the participating malls were nearly as empty in those shopping-free hours as ever. 

                                                        Adapted from The International Herald Tribune, Tuesday, July 9, 2013 
The “common phenomenon” mentioned in the last paragraph most likely refers to the fact that

                                          FIGHTING FAT IN THE DESERT 

                                                  By Rod Nordland 

1 Qatari officials have been racking their brains to find a way to address their country's epidemic of obesity. They have built sports facilities, parks, and a splendid hillside road in the capital, with a seaside promenade and parkour stations; hosted fun runs with hefty cash prizes; set up free body mass index and blood pressure monitoring stations. Anything money can buy to draw their citizens — said to be first-richest in the world and sixth-fattest — out of a sedentary lifestyle, they seem to have bought.

2 The only thing is, even Qatar's great wealth has not been able to do anything about the weather, and in a country where highs top 40 degrees Celsius (104 Fahrenheit) for a large part of the year, getting anyone to go out and walk, let alone do outdoor sports, is a lost cause. About the only pedestrians in the summer, when temperatures are even higher, are expatriates. 

3 Now the sports health authorities have introduced a new program that aims to reach Qataris where they live, or at least where they shop — the climate-controlled shopping mall. Four of the emirate's major malls are participating in the program, called “Step Into Health: Walk More, Walk the Mall," posting maps and walking routes, along with information about how many calories could be burned in the process. The malls are also opening their halls two hours before and after shopping hours, for those who want their exercise free of consumerism.

4 “Mall walking is the perfect workout, alongside controlled temperatures; it provides a clean and safe environment to exercise," a promotional brochure for “Step Into Health" reads. The mall walk program is part of a broader effort to encourage Qataris “to walk 10,000 steps and more a day in a noncompetitive, recreational and social way." The organizers hasten to reassure people that mall walking need not be strenuous. “Unlike most community exercise programs, Step Into Health is not about working up a sweat," they say. The walking routes and speeds they have outlined are not likely to do that. 

5 Obesity is a touchy subject in the emirate. Data from the International Association for the Study of Obesity shows that Qatar has the highest obesity rates in the Middle East. About 34 percent of Qatar's men and 45 percent of its women are obese, defined as a body mass index of more than 30. 

6 Those figures, however, only begin to tell the tale. They are based on the emirate's total population of about 1.9 million, but most of those are migrant workers. Qatari citizens number only about 250,000. Since most of the migrant workers are construction and other manual laborers, obesity rates among citizens are likely to be far higher than overall figures suggest. 

7 The first mall walk two weeks ago was pronounced a big success by the government-controlled news media, with some 1,000 people showing up to take part — encouraged by handouts of pedometers (free to anyone who registers for Step Into Health), and free raffles of iPhones, laptops and other Qatari-size baubles. 

8 After that initial outpouring of interest, however, there was relatively little follow-up — a common phenomenon, as every gym manager knows. Soon after, the participating malls were nearly as empty in those shopping-free hours as ever. 

                                                        Adapted from The International Herald Tribune, Tuesday, July 9, 2013 
According to the information in the article, the fact that migrant workers make up the majority of Qatar’s population