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Ano de prova

Questões do ENEM 2014

Questões aplicadas na prova de 2014, cada uma em página própria com enunciado, alternativas e gabarito.

  • 3.115 questões

Resultados: 3.115 questões

Página 41 de 156

  • Matemática

    Matemática

    Em uma urna existem 10 bolinhas de cores diferentes, das quais sete têm massa de 300 gramas cada e as outras três têm massa de 200 g cada. Serão retiradas 3 bolinhas, sem reposição.

    A probabilidade de que a massa total das 3 bolinhas retiradas seja de 900 gramas é de:
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 593d93ea-3c
  • Linguagens

    Português

    O termo oikonomía, ou economia, surgiu na Grécia Antiga para designar a arte de administrar o lar. E, durante séculos, o estado dos fenômenos relativos à produção, distribuição, acumulação e ao consumo de bens materiais simplesmente não existiu ou permaneceu limitado à esfera individual e familiar.
    [...] Com a abertura dos caminhos das Índias e das Américas, diferentes civilizações, até então isoladas, se integraram à economia europeia. Iniciava-se aí a expansão do mercado em escala mundial. Diante de tal expansão, intelectuais de várias nações europeias desenvolveram reflexões no intuito de transformar o comércio numa fonte ainda maior de riqueza. Surgiram então diferentes políticas econômicas, destinadas a orientar os governos quanto às intervenções que eventualmente deveriam efetuar, a fim de aumentar a prosperidade nacional.


    No período “O termo oikonomía, ou economia, surgiu na Grécia Antiga para designar a arte de administrar o lar”, predomina a seguinte função da linguagem:
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 59641241-fb
  • Ciências da Natureza

    Física

    A umidade relativa é a razão obtida dividindo-se a massa de vapor de água presente num dado volume de ar pela massa de vapor de água que poderia estar presente nesse mesmo volume e à mesma temperatura, caso o ar estivesse saturado. Portanto, ar saturado de vapor de água tem umidade relativa de 100%.

    Verifca-se, que numa sala com 320 m3 de ar a 23º C, a umidade relativa é de 50%. Sabendo-se que ar saturado a 23º C contém 20 gramas de vapor de água por metro cúbico de ar e que a massa específca da água é 1,0 kg/L, conclui-se que, se todo o vapor de água presente na sala fosse liquefeito, seria possível obter um volume de água de
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5974c8b0-03
  • Linguagens

    Literatura

    A questão deve ser respondida com base na leitura dos trechos a seguir.

    TEXTO 1

    Tanto de meu estado me acho incerto,
    Que, em vivo ardor, tremendo estou de frio
    Sem causa, juntamente choro e rio,
    O mundo todo abarco, e nada aperto.

    (CAMÕES, Luís Vaz de. In: Sonetos para amar o amor. FARACO, Sergio [Org.]. Porto Alegre: L&PM, 2007, p. 15.)

    TEXTO 2

    Este inferno de amar – como eu amo! –
    Quem mo pôs aqui n'alma... quem foi?
    Esta chama que alenta e consome,
    Que é a vida – e que a vida destrói –
    Como é que se veio a atear,
    Quando – ai quando se há-de ela apagar?

    (GARRET, Almeida. “Este inferno de amar”. In: MOISÉS, Massaud. A literatura portuguesa através dos textos. São Paulo: Cultrix, 2004, p. 252.)

    Almeida Garret é um dos principais nomes do Romantismo em Portugal. No Texto 2, de sua autoria, constitui uma importante característica da estética romântica:
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 59753959-ac
  • Ciências Humanas

    Geografia

    Imagem da questão de Geografia, ENEM 2014, Energia

    A imagem indica pontos com ativo uso de tecnologia, correspondentes a que processo de intervenção no espaço?
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 59f5be47-7c
  • Ciências da Natureza

    Física

    Uma forma de aquecer água é usando aquecedores elétricos de imersão, dispositivos que transformam energia elétrica em energia térmica, mediante o uso de resistores elétricos. Um desses aquecedores, projetado para fornecer energia na razão de 500 calorias por segundo, é utilizado no aquecimento de 500 gramas de água, da temperatura de 20º C para 80º C. Considerando que toda a energia transferida é aproveitada no aquecimento da água e sabendo que o calor específco da água é c = 1,0 cal/g.ºC, o tempo necessário para atingir 80º C é igual a
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a5915a3-03
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    The excerpt from the fourth paragraph – had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. – denotes an idea of
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a64e47e-3c
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    The word hers, as used in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph, refers to the Argentine
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a711c00-3c
  • Linguagens

    Português

    O termo oikonomía, ou economia, surgiu na Grécia Antiga para designar a arte de administrar o lar. E, durante séculos, o estado dos fenômenos relativos à produção, distribuição, acumulação e ao consumo de bens materiais simplesmente não existiu ou permaneceu limitado à esfera individual e familiar.
    [...] Com a abertura dos caminhos das Índias e das Américas, diferentes civilizações, até então isoladas, se integraram à economia europeia. Iniciava-se aí a expansão do mercado em escala mundial. Diante de tal expansão, intelectuais de várias nações europeias desenvolveram reflexões no intuito de transformar o comércio numa fonte ainda maior de riqueza. Surgiram então diferentes políticas econômicas, destinadas a orientar os governos quanto às intervenções que eventualmente deveriam efetuar, a fim de aumentar a prosperidade nacional.


    No período “Com a abertura dos caminhos das Índias e das Américas, diferentes civilizações, até então isoladas, se integraram à economia europeia”, a palavra em destaque é usada em sentido
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a72e181-fb
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    According to the sixth paragraph,
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a768bed-3c
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    In the excerpt from the last paragraph – ... perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state – the expression financial rogue state implies a country which is
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a7d3394-3c
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    The last paragraph implies that
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a82607f-3c
  • Linguagens

    Inglês

    Argentina defaults – Eighth time unlucky

    Cristina Fernández argues that her country's latest default is different. She is missing the point.

    Aug 2nd 2014

         ARGENTINA'S first bond, issued in 1824, was supposed to have had a lifespan of 46 years. Less than four years later, the government defaulted. Resolving the ensuing stand-off with creditors took 29 years. Since then seven more defaults have followed, the most recent this week, when Argentina failed to make a payment on bonds issued as partial compensation to victims of the previous default, in 2001.

         Most investors think they can see a pattern in all this, but Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, insists the latest default is not like the others. Her government, she points out, had transferred the full $539m it owed to the banks that administer the bonds. It is America’s courts (the bonds were issued under American law) that blocked the payment, at the behest of the tiny minority of owners of bonds from 2001 who did not accept the restructuring Argentina offered them in 2005 and again in 2010. These “hold-outs”, balking at the 65% haircut the restructuring entailed, not only persuaded a judge that they should be paid in full but also got him to freeze payments on the restructured bonds until Argentina coughs up.

        Argentina claims that paying the hold-outs was impossible. It is not just that they are “vultures" as Argentine officials often put it, who bought the bonds for cents on the dollar after the previous default and are now holding those who accepted the restructuring (accounting for 93% of the debt) to ransom. The main problem is that a clause in the restructured bonds prohibits Argentina from offering the hold-outs better terms without paying everyone else the same. Since it cannot afford to do that, it says it had no choice but to default.

         Yet it is not certain that the clause requiring equal treatment of all bondholders would have applied, given that Argentina would not have been paying the hold-outs voluntarily, but on the courts' orders. Moreover, some owners of the restructured bonds had agreed to waive their rights; had Argentina made a concerted effort to persuade the remainder to do the same, it might have succeeded. Lawyers and bankers have suggested various ways around the clause in question, which expires at the end of the year. But Argentina's government was slow to consider these options or negotiate with the hold-outs, hiding instead behind indignant nationalism.

         Ms Fernández is right that the consequences of America's court rulings have been perverse, unleashing a big financial dispute in an attempt to solve a relatively small one. But hers is not the first government to be hit with an awkward verdict. Instead of railing against it, she should have tried to minimise the harm it did. Defaulting has helped no one: none of the bondholders will now be paid, Argentina looks like a pariah again, and its economy will remain starved of loans and investment.

         Happily, much of the damage can still be undone. It is not too late to strike a deal with the hold-outs or back an ostensibly private effort to buy out their claims. A quick fix would make it easier for Argentina to borrow again internationally. That, in turn, would speed development of big oil and gas deposits, the income from which could help ease its money troubles.

       More important, it would help to change perceptions of Argentina as a financial rogue state. Over the past year or so Ms Fernández seems to have been trying to rehabilitate Argentina's image and resuscitate its faltering economy. She settled financial disputes with government creditors and with Repsol, a Spanish oil firm whose Argentine assets she had expropriated in 2012. This week's events have overshadowed all that. For its own sake, and everyone else's, Argentina should hold its nose and do a deal with the hold-outs.

    (http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21610263. Adapted)


    In the last sentence of the text, the use of the phrase Argentina should hold its nose implies that Argentina should
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a8750ea-3c
  • Linguagens

    Português

    “Repouso”

    (tuas asas silentes levemente pousam
    sobre meus olhos
    e encobrem meus medos)

    lá fora é a rua:
    há um grito de cal
    estridente como uma buzina
    e cabeças passam
    esfaqueadas pelo sol

    aqui – tuas asas
    enormes e vaporosas
    apaziguam o clima...

    há uma guerra lá fora:
    o nosso amor contra a guerra?
    – sangue jovem de pé pelo nosso amor

    ah, tuas asas tranquilas me protegem:
    deixei de escutar as bombas...

    Quando sair, amor
    estarei mais forte para a batalha

    (MELO, João. In: Vozes poéticas da lusofonia. Instituto Camões, 1999. Disponível em: . Acesso: 22 fev. 2014.)

    Dentre os diversos fatores históricos e sociais que caracterizam a literatura produzida em Angola nas últimas décadas, destacam-se a memória da luta anticolonial e os flagelos da extensa guerra civil que se seguiu à independência. No poema de João Melo, o conflito social é expresso na oposição entre a guerra e:
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a8beeae-ac
  • Ciências da Natureza

    Física

    A força resistiva (Fr) que o ar exerce sobre os corpos em movimento assume, em determinadas condições, a expressão Fr = k · v2 , em que v é a velocidade do corpo em relação a um referencial inercial e k é uma constante para cada corpo. Para que a expressão citada seja homogênea, a unidade de k, no sistema internacional de unidades, deve ser
    Escolha uma alternativa para a questão 5a93a441-3c
  • Ciências da Natureza

    Física

    Dois estudantes da FGV divertem-se jogando sinuca, após uma exaustiva jornada de estudos. Um deles impulsiona a bola branca sobre a bola vermelha, idênticas exceto pela cor, inicialmente em repouso. Eles observam que, imediatamente após a colisão frontal, a bola branca para e a vermelha passa a se deslocar na mesma direção e no mesmo sentido da velocidade anterior da bola branca, mas de valor 10% menor que a referida velocidade. Sobre esse evento, é correto afirmar que houve conservação de momento linear do sistema de bolas, mas sua energia mecânica diminuiu em
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